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Abstract
This Article argues there is a legal duty to disobey illegal nuclear strike
orders. Failure to carry out this duty may result in criminal and civil liability.
Because nuclear weapons are quantitatively and qualitatively different from
conventional weapons, typical legal calculations regulating their use under the
laws of war or humanitarian law, as well as human rights law, change along with
the change in weaponry.
At least five “unique characteristics” of nuclear weapons ominously
distinguish them from conventional weapons in ways that promise only to
increase civilian death and suffering. First, quantitatively, the blast power, heat,
and energy generated far outstrip that of conventional weapons, likely rendering
nuclear weapons indiscriminate. Second, qualitatively, the radiation released is so
powerful that it damages DNA and causes death and severe health defects
throughout the entire lives of survivors as well as their children. Third, nuclear
weapons make virtually impossible humanitarian assistance to survivors at the
blast scene struggling to survive, leading to more suffering and death. Fourth,
damage to the environment may produce not only devastating environmental
harm itself but also widespread famine and starvation. Fifth, nuclear weapons
cause long-lasting multi-generational psychological injury to survivors of the
blast.
All of these factors weigh heavily against the humanitarian goals of the
law of war and human rights law, which are designed chiefly to prevent and
reduce civilian death and suffering. These humanitarian and human rights rules
require distinction between combatants and civilians, proportionality in attack,
military necessity, prevention of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury,
and prevention of the arbitrary loss of life.
This Article’s thesis largely boils down to: If conventional weapons can be
used to achieve the same or similar military objectives as nuclear weapons in
proximity to civilians, and nuclear weapons are ordered to be used instead, that
order may be manifestly illegal, leading to war crimes for which actors can be
liable if they obey the illegal order. This universal customary international law
applies both to state and non-state actors alike.
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The destructive power of nuclear weapons
cannot be contained in either space or time.
–The International Court of Justice

I. Introduction
This Article answers a series of complex questions given urgency by the
renewed attention around the world to the possible use of nuclear weapons.1 For
instance, is there such a thing as an illegal nuclear strike order? If so, what would
it look like? And, if there is such an order, what kind of right or, more accurately,
what kind of duty exists to disobey it? For the right arises out of, and is thus
incidental to, a duty to disobey. Would the duty be simply moral or consciencebased? Or is there a legal duty as well? And if it is the latter, what law governs?
National? International?
Moreover, what are the practical and theoretical implications of the
answers to these questions? Are we talking about merely an affirmative defense to
a domestic charge of not following orders? Or, perhaps, something of greater
symbolic, real world, and legal value to the international system as a whole
regarding how international law does and should treat the use of nuclear weapons
around the globe. That is, an international legal framework applicable to all
states—and even non-state actors—that holds specific personnel accountable for
following illegal orders, even if the legality of nuclear weapons themselves as a
general matter has not yet been definitively resolved.2

1

For purposes of this Article, “use” means nuclear strike. Other possible “uses,” such as the role
nuclear weapons play in deterrence and mutually assured destruction, are not included within the
definition and are not the subject of this Article.
2
The new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons pushes toward outlawing nuclear
weapons altogether under international law. See Rick Gladstone, A Treaty Is Reached to Ban
Nuclear Arms. Now Comes the Hard Part, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/world/americas/united-nations-nuclear-weaponsprohibition-destruction-global-treaty.html?_r=0; Jacqueline Klimas, Nuclear Powers Rebuked As
122
Nations
Adopt
U.N.
Ban,
POLITICO,
(July
7,
2017),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/07/atomic-weapons-ban-united-nations-2017-240309
[https://perma.cc/5MYX-P59D]. But as we shall see, infra Part IV.A., as a treaty, once it enters
into force it will bind only states parties. Moreover, those states most affected by the treaty—
namely, nuclear weapons states—have refused to support the treaty ban and have rejected it as a
broader norm-forming instrument necessary for the creation of general or “customary”
international law. Both because this repudiation of the treaty is by the most powerfully affected
states, and because the objections come at the genesis of the potential norm-formation, these
nuclear “persistent objector” states stunt a broader, non-treaty prohibition on nuclear weapons
under customary international law or, if such a norm were to form, it would not apply to the
objecting states. See Dino Kritsiotis, On the Possibilities of and for Persistent Objection, 21 DUKE
J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 121, 129–30 (2010). To be sure, the very fact that these states have both
updated their nuclear arsenals and maintained their right to use nuclear weapons is strong evidence

88

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 9

This Article proposes a novel account of the law’s relationship to nuclear
weapons. Thus far, the great bulk of policy and legal conversation regarding
nuclear weapons has addressed in blanket fashion whether their use is legal at all.
But the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has refused to categorically outlaw
their use,3 and the reality is that states (and perhaps non-state actors) presently
possess nuclear weapons and have expressed a willingness to use them.
Accordingly, this Article addresses the different question of whether certain
nuclear strikes would be illegal if nuclear weapons were used. And, further,
whether there is a legal duty to refuse to carry out an illegal strike order, as well
as the implications of any such duty—such as susceptibility to criminal
prosecution or civil liability for serious violations of international law, like war
crimes and the arbitrary deprivation of life.
Hence it is important at the outset to understand what this Article is and is
not about: It is not advocating the outlawing of nuclear weapons across the board.
Formal international institutions combined with components of customary
international law have largely settled that question, at least for the time being.
This Article is also not a policy piece about the strategic use of nuclear weapons,
examining, say, the desirability of deterrence through nuclear weapon stockpiling
or the role that mutually assured destruction plays in preventing a nuclear
holocaust.
Rather, the Article’s argument is fundamentally legal and comprises at
least three key questions: (1) when is a nuclear strike order illegal; (2) is there a
legal duty to disobey the illegal order; and (3) what are the implications of
refusing to disobey the order? As a preliminary matter, the analysis does not
contend that all uses of nuclear weapons are necessarily illegal. For purposes of
the Article, nuclear weapons, like all weapons, are permissible unless they
contravene the laws of war or what is called international humanitarian law.4
There may be some situations in which the use of nuclear weapons does not
contravene the laws of war. For instance, the ICJ mused about “the use of nuclear
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which its very
survival is at stake”5—a scenario that ties into the discussion of “belligerent
reprisals” later in the Article.6 Others have argued that “use of a low yield nuclear
weapon against warships on the High Seas or troops in sparsely populated areas”

that the components necessary to form customary international law are lacking, as also discussed
infra at Part IV.A. In the absence of a solid prohibition on their use, nuclear weapons remain—the
Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty notwithstanding—legal for non-states parties to the treaty, i.e., those
states that actually possess and therefore may use nuclear weapons. Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 21 (July 8) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion].
3
See Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 97.
4
Id. ¶ 21.
5
Id. ¶ 97.
6
Infra Part IV.B.5.
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might be legal under international law.7 These situations occupy a legal limbo
where the use of nuclear weapons might be legal but also might not necessarily be
illegal—in short, their legality under international law would be contested.8
Instead of dwelling in this limbo, the Article concentrates on “clearly” or
“manifestly” illegal nuclear strikes for which liability attaches and, in this regard,
seeks to be a referent for commanders and soldiers tasked with the use of nuclear
weapons in proximity to civilian populations. Part II begins by articulating the
origins of a duty to disobey illegal orders and elaborates the “clearly” or
“manifestly” illegal standard. Next, Part III explains why nuclear weapons have
unique destructive powers, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as opposed to
conventional weapons. The discussion of why nuclear weapons are uniquely
destructive sets the stage for the Article’s principal thesis in Part IV: Under
international humanitarian and human rights law, if conventional weapons can be
used near a civilian population to achieve the same or similar military objectives
as nuclear weapons, then it would most likely be manifestly illegal to use nuclear
weapons. And, as such, liability would generally attach to a commander who fails
to disobey a nuclear-strike order in this situation. One possible exception to
liability attaching would be the doctrine of “belligerent reprisals.” As will be
discussed, while the strike itself would remain illegal, it may nonetheless be
justified under this doctrine and, accordingly, the doctrine may offer an
affirmative defense to liability.9 Part V then discusses the chain of command in
ordering a nuclear strike and issues of immunity, starting with the head of state on
down. For only those with sufficient information to refuse an illegal order can be
held liable under basic rule-of-law principles, so an individual’s position in the
chain of command partly determines his liability risk. Finally, Part VI confronts
the problem of non-state actors. It concludes that they are subject to the same
standards and duties as state actors due to the universal nature of customary
international law and international humanitarian and human rights law in
particular, which are designed to prevent and minimize loss of civilian life.
II. The Duty to Disobey
A. The Duty
The duty to disobey an illegal order to launch a nuclear weapon originates
in international law’s rejection of the defense that an individual is excused from

7

Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 91 (quoting the United Kingdom, Written Statement before
the Court, ¶ 3.44).
8
Customary international law is largely an empirical phenomenon reliant upon the practice of
states, including entering into treaties, to define the contours of its rules. The office of this paper
will be strikes that are clearly or manifestly illegal at the core of established rules of humanitarian
law. Absent a universally or near universally ratified treaty, the legality of the peripheral gray area
scenarios could be discerned only by some additional data, in the form of actual strikes and
reactions thereto by states.
9
See infra Part IV.B.5.
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liability because he followed “superior orders.”10 Colloquially put, the defense
goes something like this: “I cannot be liable for carrying out an illegal act because
I was simply following orders.” At least since the Nazis were prosecuted for war
crimes and crimes against humanity at Nuremberg, this defense has largely
disintegrated. I say “largely” because the argument may sometimes be used as a
mitigating circumstance where, for example, the court determines that justice so
requires.11 But because those atop the chain of command are most likely to be in
the best position to question and refuse an illegal order to use nuclear weapons,12
it is hard to imagine this mitigating situation adhering in the context of launching
a nuclear strike.
In language that became pregnant for international humanitarian and
human rights law instruments and jurisprudence, the Nuremberg Charter
explicitly rejected the superior-orders defense. Article 8 provides: “The fact that
the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not
free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment
if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.”13 Similar language appears in
the Charter of the Military Tribunal for the Far East14 and in other international
criminal tribunal statutes, like the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia,15 the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda,16 and the Rome Statute constituting the International Criminal Court
(ICC).17
The duty to reject illegal superior orders has also made its way into
national law that follows or incorporates international law on liability for
subordinates; for example, the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War
10

See, e.g., Charles Garraway, Superior Orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice
Delivered or Justice Denied?, 81 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 785, 785–94 (1999).
11
See infra notes 13–17.
12
See infra Part V.
13
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement) art. 8, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Agreement].
14
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 6, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1589 (amended Apr. 26, 1946).
15
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art.
7(4), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
16
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 6(4), U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
17
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter ICC Statute]. The ICC statute was innovative because it brought in the “manifestly
illegal” standard that will be discussed immediately below. Article 33 reads in pertinent part: “The
fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of this Court has been committed by a person pursuant to
an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that
person of criminal responsibility unless . . . [t]he order was not manifestly unlawful.” Id. art.
33(1)(c). For an explanation of this change and its ramifications, see Garraway, supra note 10, at
785–94. For a critique of the “manifestly illegal” standard, see Lydia Ansermet, Note, Manifest
Illegality and the ICC Superior Orders Defense: Schuldtheorie Mistake of Law Doctrine as an
Article 33(1)(c) Panacea, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1425, 1450–56 (2014).
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Manual.18 As C. Robert Kehler, former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) explains, U.S. soldiers are “bound to question (and ultimately
refuse) illegal orders.”19 Yet, presaging the discussion below of the standard that
applies when holding actors accountable for refusing to disobey illegal orders,20
both the Rome Statute and U.S. law require more than just the receipt of orders
that are merely legally debatable as to legitimate disobedience. As we will see,
this heightened threshold comports well with real-world practice.
Before addressing this heightened standard, it is important to clarify why
disintegration of the superior-orders defense has birthed a duty and, incidentally, a
right to disobey an illegal order to launch a nuclear strike. The reason is
straightforward: If an actor does not refuse to disobey the illegal order, he or she
violates the law and can be held liable. Both international and domestic law make
plain that subordinates are not to carry out illegal orders. As the remainder of the
Article shows, when it comes to nuclear strikes, those orders are likely to result in
serious violations of international law, such as war crimes, for which actors can
be held criminally and civilly accountable. In short, any command to break the
law is ultra vires and gives rise to liability, which subordinates have a duty and a
right not only to avoid but also to reject. What that law is and how it operates will
be the subject of Part IV.
B. The Standard
But how to tell whether to impose liability and thus whether a duty arises?
Yes, the order must be illegal—but how illegal? The entire structure of military
command and efficacy would crumble if subordinates started second-guessing
orders that they deemed of marginal or debatable legality. The standard adopted
by the ICC and the U.S. military provides that the order must be “manifestly
unlawful,”21 or constitute “clearly illegal orders to commit violations of the law of
war.” 22 Hence the threshold for disobeying an order is higher than just an
arguably illegal order.23 It means knowing, or being reasonably expected to know,
that the order is illegal and does not hinge upon solely contextual or situational
judgments.24 Put another way, the relevant mens rea is that superior orders are not
a defense if the actor knows or should know that the order is manifestly illegal, or
grossly deviates from what a reasonable person knows or should know; the order
18

OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 1075, § 18.3.2.1 (rev. vol.
2016),
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%2
0-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190
[https://perma.cc/GU3E-26AE] [hereinafter LOW MANUAL].
19
C. Robert Kehler, Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Use, 145 DAEDALUS 50, 55 (2016).
20
See infra Part II.B.
21
ICC Statute, supra note 17, art. 33(1)(C).
22
LOW MANUAL, supra note 18, at 1048.
23
Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CALIF. L.
REV. 939, 971 (1998) (“Where a soldier must exercise situational judgment in order to ascertain
the unlawfulness of a superior’s order, that order is not manifestly illegal.”).
24
Id.
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must be illegal on its face.25 The U.S. Department of Defense manual cites as
examples orders to “fire upon the shipwrecked” or to “kill defenseless persons
who have submitted to and are under effective physical control” of U.S. forces.26
It would also include the targeted murder of innocent civilians. For
instance, if a soldier were ordered to shoot a baby in the head, that would be
manifestly illegal and any subordinate should know it is illegal. It is this threshold
that must be kept in mind as we move forward into the unique characteristics of
nuclear weapons, the relevant international law governing armed conflicts, and
the decisions made by those who have the power and the information to
effectively launch nuclear weapons.
In short, where conventional weapons can be used in proximity to civilians
to achieve the same or similar military objectives instead of nuclear weapons, an
order to use a nuclear weapon would be manifestly illegal and anyone with
sufficient factual knowledge regarding the circumstances of the order should
know it. In turn, that person has both a duty and a right to disobey the nuclear
strike order. All of this hinges, of course, on knowing why and how nuclear
weapons are different.
III. Nuclear Weapons Are Different
As the ICJ has recognized, and as science and experience demonstrate,
nuclear weapons are different from conventional weapons. According to the ICJ,
nuclear weapons have “certain unique characteristics” resulting from the release
of “not only immense quantities of heat and energy, but also of powerful and
prolonged radiation,”27 with the latter being “peculiar to nuclear weapons.”28 In
other words, there is a “qualitative as well as quantitative difference between
nuclear weapons and all conventional arms.”29 These differences render nuclear
weapons not only uniquely catastrophic, but also uniquely unpredictable. Indeed,

25

CrimA 36/91 or 40/61 Attorney-Gen. of the Gov’t of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 275, 277
(1962) (Isr.) (quoting an earlier Israeli case, Kafr Kassen case App. 279-83, (1958), Ofer v. Chief
Military Prosecutor, (A) vol. 44: 362). (“The distinguishing mark of a “manifestly unlawful order”
should fly like a black flag above the order given, as a warning saying ‘Prohibited.’ Not formal
unlawfulness, hidden or half-hidden, nor unlawfulness discernible only to the eyes of legal
experts, is important here, but a flagrant and manifest breach of the law, definite and necessary
unlawfulness appearing on the face of the order itself, the clearly criminal character of the acts
ordered to be done, unlawfulness piercing the eye and revolting the heart, be the eye not blind nor
the heart not stony and corrupt, that is the measure of "manifest unlawfulness" required to release
a soldier from the duty of obedience upon him and make him criminally responsible for his acts.”).
26
LOW MANUAL, supra note 18, at 1049.
27
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 35.
28
Id. Importantly, I exclude here the ICJ’s holding that nuclear weapons may be lawful in “an
extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the very survival of a state may be at stake.” Id. ¶
97.
29
Id. ¶ 86.
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as the ICJ aptly and forebodingly put it, “[t]he destructive power of nuclear
weapons cannot be contained in either space or time.”30
While some debate among experts exists as to whether a particularly lowyield nuclear bomb might have a smaller blast yield than the most powerful
conventional bomb,31 it is commonly accepted that nuclear weapons generally
produce heat and energy that far exceed the capabilities of any conventional
weapon, no matter how powerful.32 Unlike conventional weapons, which certainly
can cause tremendous destruction (think the firebombing of Dresden), nuclear
weapons create a fireball that forms in less than a millionth of a second at several
tens of millions of degrees, vaporizing all matter into gas or plasma. There is no
opportunity to plan for or escape the attack as in a comparatively “slow motion”
firebombing; the nuclear detonation instantaneously incinerates everything in its
path.33 Hence, quantitatively, the potential for destruction and the resulting loss of
human life from a nuclear weapon differ from conventional weapons. This affects
the law-of-war or humanitarian law calculi discussed in Part IV.B, as a matter of
sheer blast power, scope, and detonation timing.
Yet perhaps the most distinct feature of nuclear weapons is their
qualitative differences from conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons release
massive amounts of thermal and ionizing radiation. As Stuart Casey-Maslen
notes, the effects of this radiation on the body are “prodromal, hematologic,
gastrointestinal, pulmonary, cutaneous and neurovascular.” 34 In fact, ionizing

30

Id. ¶ 35.
Compare email from Chris Jenks, Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law, to
Anthony Colangelo, Res. Fellow and Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law (Apr. 17,
2017, 08:23 CDT) (on file with author) and follow-up email from Chris Jenks, to Anthony
Colangelo (May 22, 2017, 10:29 CDT) (on file with author) (“MOAB, with an explosive yield of
11 tons of TNT, exceeds a number of lower yield/ tactical nuclear weapons. And I don’t believe
that’s really arguable, there are federation of American scientists, US air force, and DoD sources,
among others on the explosive yield of a number of tactical nukes being less than 11 tons of TNT,
including the: B61, B65, W25, W54, the Davy Crockett, and the Special Atomic Demo
Munition. To my limited knowledge neither the US nor any state intentionally develops tactical
nukes any more, so anyone with that low yield a nuclear weapon is probably because they are
struggling with design/manufacturing. But the broader point stands, that the MOAB has a greater
explosive yield than a number of lower yield/tactical nuclear weapons the US has fielded at
various points over the years.”), with email from John Burroughs, Exec. Dir., Lawyers Comm. on
Nuclear Policy, to Anthony Colangelo (May 10, 2017, 12:33 CDT) (on file with author) (“So far
as I know second-hand, and I have been following expert literature a long time, the lowest yield of
the B-61 gravity bombs is .3 kiloton or so, an order of magnitude more than MOAB.”).
32
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 35.
33
See generally SAMUEL GLASSTONE & PHILIP J. DOLAN, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(3d ed. 1977).
34
Stuart Casey-Maslen, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and Human Rights, 97 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 663, 673 (2015).
31
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radiation is so strong and pervasive that it actually alters the structure of atoms.35
Tilman Ruff explains:
It poses risks of acute illness (in high doses) and at any dose, long-term
genetic mutations and increased risk of most cancers and a variety of
chronic diseases, including cardiovascular and respiratory disease.
Ionizing radiation has a high propensity to damage large, complex
molecules like DNA, which are crucial to life, because its energy is
delivered in large packets. A dose of radiation acutely lethal to a human
being can contain no more energy than the heat in a sip of hot coffee.36
Indeed, the duration of ionizing radiation’s effects may cause serious harms that
last throughout the lifetime of survivors. Studies show that the occurrence of solid
cancers increases in proportion to radiation dose, 37 as do hematological
malignancies of blood forming organs (i.e., leukemia). 38 To be sure, cancers
caused by exposure to ionizing radiation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki persist to this
day.39
Just as devastating are the direct effects upon children and the unborn.
Based on scientific reports,40 Peter Hayes adroitly explains in accessible terms,
“already fused zygotes at [the] time of exposure; or . . . genetically damaged
eggs/sperms in the survivors . . . that subsequently fuse . . . are non-viable in the
lifetime of the survivors,”41 thereby preventing births within the survivor group.42
Radiation exposure may also cause mental and growth retardation,
“malformations such as microphthalmia, skeletal and genital malformations,” as
35

Tilman A. Ruff, The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the
Pacific Region, 97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 775, 801 (2015).
36
Id.; see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, HEALTH RISKS FROM EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF
IONIZING RADIATION: BEIR VII PHASE 2, at 6 (2006) [hereinafter BEIR VII] (“Ionizing radiation
has sufficient energy to change the structure of molecules, including DNA, within the cells of the
human body. Some of these molecular changes are so complex that it may be difficult for the
body’s repair mechanisms to mend them correctly.”).
37
BEIR VII, supra note 36, at 6.
38
Ruff, supra note 35, at 801–02.
39
Paul Voorhees, Hiroshima and Nagasaki Cast Long Shadows Over Radiation Science, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/04/11/11greenwire-hiroshima-andnagasaki-cast-long-shadows-over-99849.html?pagewanted=all.
40
See generally NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, COMM. ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING
RADIATION, HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION: BEIR V
(1990).
41
Email from Peter Hayes, Honorary Professor, Ctr. for Int’l Sec. Stud., Sydney Univ. (Austl.)
and Dir., Nautilus Inst. for Sec. & Sustainability, to Anthony Colangelo (June 13, 2017, 20:17
CDT) (on file with author).
42
Some have even suggested that radiation exposure can cause trans-generational harms; that is, it
may pass from one generation to the next as a result of the severely damaged DNA in those
initially exposed to the blast. See Ruff, supra note 35, at 775; Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶
35; After the Atomic Bomb: Hibakusha Tell Their Stories, 97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 507, 510
(2015) (interview with Dr. Masao Tomonaga). However, the science has yet to empirically support
this view. Thus, radiation exposure leading to trans-generational genetic effects is a perceived
harm not demonstrated scientifically yet.
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well as cancer during and subsequent to childhood. 43 Again, these uniquely
extensive effects of radiation have major consequences for the law-of-war calculi
in Part IV.B; namely, principles of distinction, proportionality, military necessity,
and prevention of unnecessary suffering.44
It is also uncontroversial that ionizing radiation would make extremely
difficult, if not impossible, any meaningful humanitarian response to a nuclear
attack, effectively stranding those most in need—a position long held by both the
World Health Organization and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement45—
further compounding and magnifying the suffering of victims, in both degree and
number. Relatedly, the radiation released by a nuclear bomb is enormously
unpredictable since it promises to cover a tremendous geographic area and is
variously dependent upon uncertain factors like shifting weather patterns and
atmospheric conditions, to which the bomb itself may significantly contribute.46
Which leads into the dire environmental harms that major nuclear
explosions or exchanges may generate, 47 causing depletion in, among other
things, the ozone layer, farming, and food production, thereby potentially
resulting in famine.48 This is due in large part to the dispersal of dirt and dust,

43

Email from Dr. Tilman Ruff, Assoc. Professor, Nossal Inst. for Global Health, Univ. of
Melbourne (Austl.), Co-President of Int’l Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, to
Anthony Colangelo (Sept. 22, 2017, 09:37 CDT) (on file with author); Tilman A. Ruff, Health
Implications of Ionising Radiation, in LEARNING FROM FUKUSHIMA: NUCLEAR POWER IN EAST
ASIA 221, 227, 229 (Peter Van Ness & Mel Gurtov eds., 2017).
44
See infra Part IV.
45
Elizabeth Minor, Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons: The Humanitarian Initiative,
97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 711, 716 (2015); see also Gregor Malich, Robin Coupland, Steve
Donnelly & Johnny Nehme, Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear Events: The
Humanitarian Response Framework of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 97 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 647, 661 (2015) (“In reality, whilst calling for greater efforts at the international
level as regards response to [nuclear] events, the authors recognize that the chances are near to
zero of bringing effective assistance to victims of large-scale use of [nuclear] weapons.”); Ruff,
supra note 35, at 812 (“It is important in this context to emphasize that no effective humanitarian
response is possible for even a single nuclear weapon detonated in a population centre, let alone
nuclear war, as has been the unequivocal conclusion of the World Health Organization and the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for many years . . . .”).
46
See infra notes 47–50 discussing environmental harms generated by nuclear detonation.
47
I say may generate because there is the possibility of a surgical nuclear strike that does not
severely impact the environment. This is contingent upon the strike not triggering escalation in the
use of nuclear weapons. Because the command and control apparatus is unable to foresee whether
the surgical strike will in fact produce escalation, the law-of-war calculation as to environmental
damage is necessarily a post-hoc inquiry in this situation. As such, it poses an interesting question
for those ordered to use nuclear weapons in a comparatively discrete manner. It seems contrary to
the rule of law to hold actors accountable for the unpredictable environmental effects of a single,
low yield nuclear strike that fails to severely impact the environment since liability would
essentially be retroactive because the effect—escalation—is not necessarily predictable.
48
Louis Maresca & Eleanor Mitchell, The Human Costs and Legal Consequences of Nuclear
Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law, 97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 621, 625 (2015); see
also Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and the Environment, 28 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
265, 266–67 (2000) (“Of course, the two incidents which caused the greatest environmental

96

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 9

contamination of water supplies by radioactive residuals, and the consequent
deterioration of both plant and animal life, posing a very real and widespread risk
of starvation for many millions of people.49 In fact, using nuclear weapons for
major attacks targeting cities or other highly populated areas could cause short
term or even prolonged (decadal) nuclear winters for large civilian populations.50
Finally, as informative as the cold hard science is, no account of the
uniquely devastating effects of nuclear detonations would be complete without
taking into consideration the actual human experiences, views, and psychological
damage to those who have survived such attacks. In Japan, the survivors of the
atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki comprise a distinct class, referred to as
hibakusha. One of the foremost experts on the effects of nuclear exposure is the
hibakusha Dr. Masao Tomonaga. He survived the detonation of the second atomic
bomb on August 9, 1945 in Nagasaki and has had a long and distinguished
medical career documenting human health and other harmful consequences
resulting from the bombings. 51 Dr. Tomonaga recounts the horror of the
experience itself and the lingering fears it instilled in survivors; namely, “[a]fter
the initial wave of elevated rates of leukaemia, which continued for about fifteen
years, a second wave of solid cancerous tumors began. Increased occurrence of
these cancers still continues today and causes great suffering for atomic bomb
survivors and their families.” 52 Similarly, Mr. Yoshiro Yamawaki, also a
hibakusha of Nagasaki, describes not only the terrible experience of the
detonation which haunts him daily and the reverberating impact of the radiation
on his psyche and well being, but also what he believes are deadly transgenerational ripples. In his words: “The effects go on across generations to the
children and grandchildren of survivors, carrying on the cruelty of using these
weapons. I have four daughters, and my oldest daughter has a type of disease that
is similar to leukemia. My second daughter is suffering from breast cancer.”53
However, the scientific data do not conclusively show trans-generational medical
harm passed to children who were not in utero at the time of the detonation.
Which does not discount the very real trans-generational mental harms
caused by nuclear weapons and their radiation ripples into future generations.
calamity in the history of armed conflict were the atomic bomb attacks on the Japanese cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945.”).
49
Maresca & Mitchell, supra note 48, at 641. Some might argue that this environmental harm
qualifies as a breach of Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I, which prohibits “methods or means
of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment”; see also Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 35.
50
See generally R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack & Carl Sagan, Nuclear
Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions, 222 SCIENCE 1283 (1983).
51
After the Atomic Bomb, supra note 42, at 507 (interview with Dr. Masao Tomonaga).
52
Id. at 509.
53
Id. at 524 (interview with Mr. Yoshiro Yamawaki). Mr. Yamawaki’s attribution may well be the
result of a lingering psychological harm and very real perceived physical harm originating his
daughter’s disease. See infra notes 54–58. If his first daughter, on the other hand, was alive or in
utero at the time of the bombing, her disease could be considered a direct effect of the bombing
itself.
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Robert Lifton explains that for survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki “[t]here is
real fear about transmitting radiation effects to subsequent generations, because it
is known to be possible.”54 This is “even though a systematic increased incidence
of birth defects in the next generation has not been demonstrated in control
studies.”55 Lifton also points out that survivors of the bombs at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki suffer severely from what he terms “psychic numbing.”56 In Lifton’s
words, “[b]ased on all evidence, of Hiroshima and everything else we know, the
numbing and listless behavior—no panic but a kind of listless, slow motion as in
Hiroshima—would likely be so extreme among that tiny contingent of survivors
[of a nuclear bomb] that people would be numb to the point of immobilization.”57
Compounding these effects are the stigma and discrimination felt by survivors
(indeed, in Japan they have their own special name) who fear deformation and
disease will be passed on to their blood lines. This fear destroys deep-seated
psychological comfort in “living on in our children and their children,” severing
the chain of life.58
In sum, at least five “unique characteristics” of nuclear weapons
ominously distinguish them from conventional weapons in ways that promise to
increase civilian death and suffering. First, quantitatively, the blast power, heat,
and energy generated far outstrip that of conventional weapons. Second, radiation
released is so powerful that it damages DNA, causing death and severe health
defects throughout the lives of survivors as well as their children exposed in utero.
Third, nuclear weapons make virtually impossible humanitarian assistance to
survivors at the blast scene struggling to survive, leading to more suffering and
death. Fourth, damage to the environment may cause not only devastating
environmental harm itself but also widespread famine and starvation. And fifth,
nuclear weapons cause long-lasting, multi-generational psychological injury to
survivors of the blast. All of these factors weigh heavily against the humanitarian
goals of the law of war, which is designed chiefly to prevent and reduce civilian
death and suffering.
IV. Law
A. Baselines
Before jumping into the specifics of international humanitarian and human
rights law, some foundations, or baselines, from which to build my argument
should be laid out.
A somewhat preliminary baseline is that the law of war goes by a few
names; it also may be called the law of armed conflict or international
54

Robert Lifton, Beyond Psychic Numbing: A Call to Awareness, 52(4) AMER. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 619, 621 (1982).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 623.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 626.

98

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 9

humanitarian law. The term international humanitarian law will be used
throughout the rest of the Article to alliteratively partner it with the related but
distinct field of human rights law. While humanitarian law governs the conduct of
hostilities, human rights law applies everywhere and to everyone. 59 Put
differently, while armed conflict triggers humanitarian law, human rights law is
ever present and ever applicable, regardless of situation—including armed
conflict. The concurrent jurisdiction furnished by these two overlapping bodies of
law gives rise to the possibility of conflicts of law. Yet, as discussed in more
detail below,60 the more specific lex specialis of humanitarian law tends to inform
and complement the governing standards of human rights law during armed
conflict, such that human rights law effectively adopts, or is heavily informed by,
international humanitarian law for certain wartime rules.61
Another baseline is that humanitarian and human rights law are
quintessentially international law. 62 To underestimate the importance of this
baseline would be a serious and ultimately very confusing mistake. It is true that
these laws are often incorporated into domestic law, 63 but their source and
substance derive not from domestic lawmaking apparatuses but instead from
international law.64

59

Here I take a customary international law view of human rights rather than a strict treaty-based
view under which, according to the U.S. position, only states are obliged to uphold human rights
abuses within their respective territories or under their effective control. Under customary law, all
human beings have certain fundamental rights—including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived
of life—that may be enforced against individual defendants, see infra Part IV.C. While a
traditional view of human rights involved the state qua state’s obligation to individuals, recent
developments like the prolific U.S. Alien Tort Statute litigation have made clear, even in the
United States, that individual human beings (and perhaps private corporations) can be liable for
depriving other human beings of fundamental human rights. These rights are also not limited to a
state’s territory but rather apply everywhere, since “there is no jurisdictional limitation to the reach
of international human rights law, at least as it applies to nuclear weapons.” Casey-Maslen, supra
note 34, at 666.
60
See infra notes 124–127, acknowledging the debate surrounding this topic but adopting the ICJ
view in the Advisory Opinion so as to move the Article forward.
61
I acknowledge that this is a hotly debated point. See generally Marko Milanovic, The Lost
Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 78
(Jens David Ohlin ed., 2014); DARAGH MURRAY ET. AL, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2016). However, I do not have the space to fully explore it in
this Article. As I discuss in Part IV.C, below, because the ICJ adopted the view of lex specialis
articulated above in its Advisory Opinion, see Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 25, I adopt it
here for purposes of moving the discussion forward.
62
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 75; see also infra note 63.
63
LOW MANUAL, supra note 18, at 1059–60.
64
Kehler, supra note 19, at 58 (former Commander of U.S. STRATCOM describing his
“responsibility to implement and enforce . . . the president’s direction to ensure [that] plans
compl[ied] with the body of international law generally described as LOAC.”). For more on the
United States’ accepting Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention as customary
international law binding on the United States, see Jeffrey G. Lewis & Scott D. Sagan, The
Nuclear Necessity Principle: Making U.S. Targeting Policy Conform with Ethics & the Laws of
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Next, there are two key types of international law at issue when it comes
to how humanitarian and human rights laws are made and operate: treaties and
custom. There is treaty law, whereby states ratify an instrument providing for
certain humanitarian and human rights protections. And then there is what is
called “customary international law.”
Treaty law is probably the easier to comprehend because it can crudely be
analogized to a contract: states contract (treaty) with each other to provide certain
humanitarian and human rights protections. If a state breaches the contract, other
states may similarly breach or take counter-measures against the breaching state
to either bring it into compliance or kick it out of the contractual community
(treaty regime). Finally, as with a contract, the treaty does not bind states that
have not assented to, or, in international legal speak, ratified, the agreement.
Custom is trickier. It is comprised of two elements: (1) state practice; and
(2) opinio juris—that is, the intent or belief that the practice arises out of a sense
of legal obligation. Unlike treaty law, this form of international law is not like a
contract. Quite the contrary, its law binds all states regardless of whether they
have ratified a treaty. As a binding customary law for all states, and indeed, all
actors everywhere, it may be thought of as a universal law that covers the globe.
In fact, there are some offenses—including war crimes—that give rise to what is
called “universal jurisdiction,” meaning any state in the world has jurisdiction to
prosecute the perpetrators.65
To satisfy the state-practice component of customary international law, the
practice must be consistent and widespread; and although the precise threshold for
widespread is as yet unresolved, there must at a minimum be a supermajority of
states that agree to and follow the rule consistently.66 The opinio juris component
can be gleaned from official statements and actions demonstrating that states
follow the practice out of a sense of legal obligation and not just for purely
political or expedient ends. This is sometimes referred to as the “psychological”
element of the customary law equation because it purports to get into the mind of
the state and communicate its thinking.67 While obviously relying in large part on
a fictional anthropomorphization of the state (since states tend not to be

War, 145 DAEDALUS 62, 67 (2016); Brian Egan, International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the
Counter-ISIL Campaign: Some Observations, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 235, 241–43 (2016).
65
See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L
L. 149 (2006).
66
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987)
(“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation.”) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW]. While it may be difficult to prove state practice with respect to nuclear weapons for the
same reason it is difficult to prove a negative, the absence of their use by states points to a practice
of, at minimum, restraint. It should also be noted that treaties themselves may, in certain
circumstances, constitute strong evidence of custom because they represent the state practice of
entering into the treaty and the opinio juris of treating the terms of that treaty as legally binding.
67
Anthony A. D’Amato, Groundwork for International Law, 108 AM J. INT’L L. 650, 666 (2014).
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monolithic in their decision-making), the psychological element nonetheless may
be a useful heuristic for understanding what is meant by opinio juris.
Now, generally speaking, a state may treaty around the default customary
rule in the same way parties may contract around a default common law rule. But
there are some norms of customary international law that cannot be circumvented
by treaty. These mandatory rules are called jus cogens, or peremptory norms of
international law.68 They are mostly framed in terms of prohibitions: no genocide,
no torture, no crimes against humanity, no war crimes.69 Thus a state cannot
decide, on its own, to opt out of these prohibitions. Nor can it treaty with another
state to do the same. It would be as if Hitler and Mussolini entered into an
agreement to exterminate ethnic minorities. Jus cogens would immediately swoop
in to invalidate that treaty from the start. It is necessary to stress again, however,
that these norms are framed in the nature of prohibitions: no genocide, no war
crimes, etc. They have little if anything to say about if and how liability attaches
to a violation of the norm—just that there is a violation of international law. This
is of crucial importance to the discussion of belligerent reprisals below70 because
it may synthesize jus cogens with other doctrines humanitarian law which
authorize otherwise unlawful conduct, at least insofar as liability is concerned.
A final baseline: there is a difference between the law of going to war (jus
ad bellum) and the humanitarian law of how one conducts war (jus in bello).71
This Article is principally concerned with the latter—how hostilities are
conducted—because that is the realm in which an illegal strike order would be
handed down. Put another way, even if a nuclear-strike order would start a legally
authorized war (jus ad bellum), it is a separate question whether the strike order
itself is a legal means of conducting the military action (jus in bello).
In short, humanitarian and human rights law are distinct but related strands
of international law, which may be based in treaty or custom. If the law is
customary, then it applies to all states and, Part VI argues, also to non-state actors.
Indeed, customary international law covers the entire globe and applies to
everyone (that is, after all, the entire point of a truly international law). Although
not every state has ratified the most relevant treaties governing humanitarian
law—in particular Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions—certain
principles of humanitarian and human rights law have passed into custom.72
Moreover, some customary law, like prohibitions on war crimes and arbitrary loss
of life, have become jus cogens73 and are also subject to universal jurisdiction.74
68

RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 66, § 702.
Id.; see also Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 83; Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A
Fiduciary Duty of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 331 (2009).
70
See infra Part IV.C.
71
See generally Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad
Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47 (2009).
72
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 41.
73
See id. ¶ 83; ICC Statute, supra note 17, art. 5(c); RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW, supra note 66, § 702(c).
69
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Accordingly, the major question for the next section is: “What types of orders to
detonate nuclear weapons are manifestly illegal under international humanitarian
and human rights law?”
B. Humanitarian Law
Four fundamental principles govern international humanitarian law:
distinction between combatants and civilians, proportionality, military necessity,
and the prevention of unnecessary suffering. These principles are classed in the
jus in bello category and any serious violation of humanitarian law is considered a
war crime.75 The differences between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons
alter the analysis of each principle under humanitarian law. The result is that an
order to launch a nuclear weapon is legally distinct from an order to launch a
conventional weapon. Since the nuclear launch order is legally distinct, or at least
produces legally distinct real-world outcomes, it invites a distinct legal analysis
that may well yield a different legal outcome. It is an analysis and an outcome
with which those responsible for deploying nuclear weapons ought to be
intimately familiar because it can mean the difference between a lawful strike and
a humanitarian or human rights violation and, consequently, the difference
between following a legal nuclear strike order and a duty and right to disobey an
illegal one.
Before getting into specifics, the difference between legal standards and
legal rules should be emphasized. A legal rule is a hard and fast line, the content
and application of which are easy to administer—think: “Do not exceed the speed
limit.” Either one exceeds the speed limit or one does not. Legal rules have the
74

See Colangelo, supra note 65, at 149.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 85, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I], which provides:
75

3. In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the following acts shall be
regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed wilfully, in violation of the
relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or
health:
(a) Making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;
(b) Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury
to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)
(iii);
(c) Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in
the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians
or damage to civilian objects, as denned in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii);
(d) Making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack;
(e) Making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors de combat;
(f) The perfidious use, in violation of Article 37, of the distinctive emblem of the red
cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other protective signs recognized by
the Conventions or this Protocol.
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advantage of ex ante clarity and administrative efficiency, but they often give rise
to after-the-fact exceptions when challenged. A legal standard, by contrast, is a
purposefully flexible and context-specific guiding principle, the content and
application of which are more situational—think: “Drive reasonably.” Both the
rule and the standard would prohibit driving recklessly but the standard may
permit, say, going above the speed limit to get someone in urgent need to the
hospital, while the rule unambiguously prohibits it. Much of humanitarian law is
essentially standard based. That is, while the principles may sometimes sound like
rules in a vacuum, their application in real life is contextual. Thus, what
constitutes a “proportional” attack under humanitarian law will depend on the
precise situation on the ground, the military advantage expected, the probability
and degree of expected civilian deaths, and—crucially—the type of weapon
used.76
As largely a collection of standards, humanitarian law mostly lacks the
situational clarity that rules enjoy. Rather, as noted, application of humanitarian
law standards is highly contextual. As such, there is less certainty at the moment
an order is handed down that the order would be illegal under the laws of war.
Accordingly, holding an individual to a strict legal-versus-illegal line in the sand
would be both unfair and unrealistic given the pressures and need to obey orders
generally in situations of armed conflict, lest the entire edifice of military
effectiveness disintegrate. Rather, as already noted,77 the needle moves in favor of
a presumption of an order’s legality, such that to refuse the order it must be
“manifestly illegal,” not merely of arguable legality. 78 The manifestly illegal
standard not only creates an affirmative defense to the charge of disobeying
orders in military proceedings;79 it also insulates defendants from borderline or
even sensationalist allegations of war crimes since in any armed conflict there is a
high probability of civilian death, some of which may be permissible under
international law.
1. Distinction
The principle of distinction or protection of civilians not taking part in
hostilities is in many ways the wellspring of all humanitarian law principles. A
famous formulation is found in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions
(which embodies customary law80):

76

See, e.g., id., art. 57(2)(a)(ii) (“With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
those who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . . take all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”).
77
See supra Part II.D.
78
See id.
79
See, e.g., JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES
Rule 916(d) (2016).
80
See Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 41, 75.
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In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall
direct their operations only against military objectives.81
As their names suggest, military personnel and military objects contribute to
military action and objectives. The destruction, capture, or neutralization of such
action and objectives must be designed to offer a direct military advantage and
must not target civilian populations.82 To adhere to the principle of distinction,
military forces must refrain from using means and methods that strike without
distinction near a civilian population. Moreover, the methods or means of attack
must protect against effects that cannot be limited as required by international
humanitarian law,83 a point to which we will return below.84 This is often referred
to as the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks85—a humanitarian law that attends
the bedrock distinction principle.
Nuclear weapons have the potential to annihilate this bedrock distinction
principle. If civilians are within the radius of the immense blast yield, they will be
incinerated along with military personnel and objectives.86 Unlike conventional
weapons, which can more accurately target military personnel and objectives,
nuclear weapons indiscriminately pulverize anything in their detonation zone,
81

Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 48. Similarly, Article 51(2) provides: “The civilian
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats
of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited.” And J.I. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck explain:
The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants.
Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against
civilians . . . . The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian
objects and military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.
J.I. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR 3 (2005).
82
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 81, at 25–26, 29.
83
Maresca & Mitchell, supra note 47, at 629; Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art.
57(2)(a)(ii).
84
See infra Part IV.B.2 (addressing the proportionality principle).
85
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 51(4):
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a
specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be
limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a
nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.
86

Strictly speaking, there is a difference between the blast zone and the thermal heat zone. They
will overlap but it is the latter that will incinerate people, as opposed to the blast effects, primary
and secondary. At the core people will simply evaporate.
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which promises to be far larger than that of any conventional weapon.
Furthermore, the ionizing radiation emanates well beyond the blast yield, killing
and harming innocent civilians (as well as their unborn children). The breadth of
effects caused by a nuclear blast means that it would be difficult to say it was
“directed” against the military objective around which civilians are located,
especially in contradistinction to conventional weapons. In brief, a nuclear blast in
any area with a civilian population would almost by definition manifestly violate
the cardinal principle of distinction where a conventional weapon option is
available, and would thus constitute a war crime.
Here an analogy can be made to biological weapons, which the
international community has outlawed.87 To borrow a phrase used by the ICJ in
the context of nuclear weapons, biological weapons also cannot be contained in
space or time. Like the indiscriminate and unpredictable consequences
geographically and temporally of biological weapons on civilian populations, the
repercussions of nuclear weapons are extraordinarily unpredictable and have the
potential to affect people far into the future and, some would argue, even future
generations.88 Thus, where effective weapons—like conventional weapons—can
be contained in space and time and are not used in favor of weapons which
cannot—like nuclear weapons—use of nuclear weapons would be manifestly
illegal under humanitarian law.
2. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality appears in a number of places in
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. For instance, Article 51(5)(b)
prohibits: “[A]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”89 Article 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b) effectively repeat this language.90 And,
according to Article 57(2)(a)(ii):
[W]ith respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: those
who plan or decide upon an attack shall: take all feasible precautions in
the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in
any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians
and damage to civilian objects.91
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Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65; Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
88
Tilman A. Ruff, The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the
Pacific Region, 97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 775 (2015); see also supra note 53.
89
Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 51(5)(b).
90
Id. art. 57(2)a(iii), 57(2)(b).
91
Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
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In other words, an attack—even an attack that is anticipated to achieve a concrete
and direct military advantage—cannot disproportionately kill or injure civilians.
Rather, both the anticipated military advantage and the loss of civilian life must
be calculated prior to the attack. In this sense, and as the language makes plain,
there is a foreseeability criterion built into the proportionality standard.92 Thus,
like other standards, the test for proportionality considers what is reasonable
under the circumstances.
As opposed to a conventional weapon attack, a strategic nuclear attack
near a civilian population is exceedingly likely to be disproportionate.
Conventional weapons, and especially “smart” weapons, can target discrete
military objectives even within civilian populated areas. Yet when it comes to
nuclear weapons, the number of civilians killed and injured will be exponentially
magnified by the larger blast yield and radiation; again, with the latter inflicting
death and disease throughout the lifetime of survivors of the initial blast—surely a
foreseeable consequence given the experience and extensive studies done
regarding the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Consequently, there is a high
probability that any nuclear attack near a civilian population would be clearly
disproportionate and, hence, manifestly illegal, if a conventional weapon
alternative is available to achieve the same military objectives. Again, the analogy
to biological weapons is instructive: like nuclear weapons, these types of weapons
cause far more harm spatially and temporally than conventional weapons,
rendering them disproportionate. Indeed, biological weapons were banned for this
very reason.93
3. Military Necessity
A leading treatise on international criminal law describes the principle of
military necessity by stating that “no act of violence can be used that does not
contribute to overcoming the enemy, whereas any act that helps overcome the
enemy is permissible unless other jus in bello principles prohibit it.”94 Similarly,
the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual includes the language,
“[m]ilitary necessity does not justify actions that are prohibited by the law of
war,”95 and the British Joint Service Manual of The Law of Armed Conflict
defines military necessity as a principle that permits “those measures which are
92
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indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to
the modern law and usages of war.”96 Just war theorists call this the “necessity
principle.” Namely, the requirement to refuse using especially catastrophic
weapons when “they are not necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives
and thereby minimize collateral damages to civilians.”97
Necessity is the source of some confusion in international humanitarian
law. For example, it is “often misunderstood to mean that regardless of the law,
warriors can do whatever it takes to win.” 98 But in fact other jus in bello
principles constrain necessity, often by way of incorporation, weaving a sort of
web of interconnected laws of war designed to reduce civilian death and harm. In
this connection, Jeffrey G. Lewis and Scott Sagan propose that when it comes to
necessity, states should refrain from using nuclear weapons when they are not
necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives, thus minimizing civilian death
and suffering.99
Because we know that nuclear weapons are quantitatively and
qualitatively different from all conventional weapons, this limitation makes sense.
When one considers the extensive blast power and coverage, the pervasive
radioactivity, and the prolonged suffering, as well as the severe environmental
harms spawned by nuclear weapons, it becomes almost impossible to conclude
that they would result in less civilian harm than conventional weapons near a
civilian population. Thus distinct principles of the humanitarian law of necessity
(which authorizes an attack to help overcome the enemy that is not contrary to
other jus in bello principles) and proportionality (which requires a proportionate
attack) exhibit a synergistic relationship supporting one another to prevent civilian
death and harm to the most realistic extent possible.100
Indeed, in a famous statement by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion, the Court observed: “The threat or use of nuclear weapons
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, and in particular rules of humanitarian law.”101 Critical to this reasoning
was the humanitarian law of necessity. The Court explained that one of the
preeminent rules requires that an “armed attack” must be “necessary,” a rule that
interacted with the proportionality requirement and that had been “well
established in customary international law.”102 As Lewis and Sagan point out, the
96
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concept of military necessity was not just whether nuclear weapons were a
military necessity to knock out a certain target, but also whether “the means
themselves were necessary to the target and thus permissible.” 103 Hence,
holistically viewed, both military necessity and the means of achieving those
necessities merge into an analysis ultimately designed to reduce civilian casualties
and harm.104 A case can therefore be made that where conventional weapons
would achieve the same military objective as a nuclear weapon, but with less
civilian death and suffering, the nuclear strike is manifestly illegal under necessity
principles.
4. Prevention of Unnecessary Suffering and Superfluous Injury
Like the principle of distinction, prevention of unnecessary suffering and
superfluous injury also appears in Additional Protocol I as a Basic rule. The rule
provides: “It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering.” 105 International humanitarian law recognizes that both death and
suffering of combatants and civilians will occur. What is impermissible is causing
unnecessary suffering.
Although this rule is designed chiefly to protect combatants,106 in modern
day usage it tends to be applied to civilians as well.107 Thus the long-term effects
of cancer and other diseases and harms throughout the lifetimes of both civilians
and military survivors must be taken into account and must inform the contextual
inquiry of whether the nuclear strike will cause unnecessary suffering and
superfluous injury. Given these considerations, it would be a rare situation in
which a nuclear option (as opposed to a conventional one) would not cause
superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. Accordingly, in the vast majority of
situations in which a nuclear weapon is used over a conventional weapon, the
nuclear option would be manifestly illegal.108
5. Belligerent Reprisals
One potential wrinkle in this Article’s argument is the controversial
doctrine of belligerent reprisals. These are “acts in breach of the law of a rule of
armed conflict directed by one belligerent party against the other with a view to
inducing the latter party to stop violating that or another rule of international
103
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humanitarian law.”109 In other words, the doctrine authorizes a state to violate a
rule of international humanitarian law as a means of halting another state’s
violation of international humanitarian law. As such, it permits an otherwise
unlawful act by one state in order to bring another state into compliance with the
law. The ICJ gave only an oblique nod to the doctrine in its Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion, noting that reprisals are prohibited against the enemy’s
environment,110 and are subject to standards of proportionality.111
Here one must distinguish between proportionality in ordinary
international humanitarian law and the exceptional situation of proportionality in
belligerent reprisals. The proportionality standard in ordinary international
humanitarian law is proportionality between expected civilian casualties and
military advantage.112 Under the principle of belligerent reprisals, however, the
reprisal must be proportionate to the breaching state’s original violation of
international law.113 The reprisal does not have to be identical to the original
breach (something that could, theoretically, plant the seed of a new customary
norm), but it must be proportionate. In other words, if State A breaches Rule X of
international law, State B need not also breach Rule X to constitute a legitimate
reprisal. Rather, State B can breach Rule Y so long as breaching Rule Y is
proportionate to breaching Rule X. Moreover, once the initial violation has
stopped, so too must the belligerent reprisal.114
A belligerent reprisal must meet a number of other criteria for the
otherwise unlawful act to be justifiable under international humanitarian law. It
must, for example, be intended to coerce the initially breaching party back into
compliance (as opposed to, say, punishing that party).115 Further, it must be
necessary. Like proportionality, in the context of belligerent reprisals the principle
of necessity takes on another meaning. Unlike necessity in ordinary international
law, which authorizes an attack to help overcome the enemy, necessity in the
context of belligerent reprisals means that the reprisal is a sort of last-resort option
after peaceful measures of persuasion have failed,116 or what is sometimes called
109
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the principle of subsidiarity.117 Naturally, in some contexts, as in the launch of a
weapon of mass destruction against a state, virtually no alternative means of
inducing compliance are possible prior to the belligerent reprisal—a scenario
discussed below.
There is also the problem of escalation. Namely, one unlawful breach will
lead to another unlawful breach, which in turn will lead to another unlawful
breach, and so on. Belligerent reprisal doctrine tries to avoid this outcome by
placing precincts on the originally breaching state by preventing what might be
thought of as counter-belligerent reprisals118—say, State A violates the law, State
B undertakes a belligerent reprisal, State A may not then undertake a counterbelligerent reprisal. Nonetheless, real-world warfare may not obey such
constraints,119 leading to the dreaded “parade of horribles” and, in large part, to
the controversy surrounding the doctrine. Other criteria insist that the initial
breach be a serious violation of international law; that the reprisal must be in
response to an initial breach (there is no such thing as a pre-emptive belligerent
reprisal); and that the reprisal cannot be undertaken against certain targets.120 It is
this last criterion that causes the most concern when it comes to nuclear weapons
and civilian death and suffering.
Although there is an observable trend in humanitarian law to protect
civilian life outright in all situations, including with respect to belligerent
reprisals, Casey-Maslen concludes after careful study that custom is
underdeveloped in the belligerent reprisal area and, as a result, “customary law
has not yet outlawed belligerent reprisals against civilians in enemy territory.”121
This leads to a vexing scenario for this Article’s thesis: Suppose State A launches
an illegal strike against both a military and a civilian population in State B,
violating essentially all or most principles of humanitarian law. To the extent an
illegal conventional weapon strike by State B complies with the belligerent
reprisal criteria, and is as effective as a nuclear strike in bringing State A into
compliance with the law, it should be used. However, if conventional weapons
cannot achieve the goals of belligerent reprisals and induce the other state into
compliance with the law, an otherwise illegal nuclear strike may be warranted.122
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Note that this scenario may contemplate a manifestly illegal use of nuclear
weapons by the reprising state. Under proportionality requirements it is hard (but
not impossible123) to imagine a belligerent reprisal involving nuclear weapons
being used in response to anything other than a prior unlawful attack similarly
employing nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, rendering the nuclear
belligerent reprisal situation (one hopes) unlikely or at least rare in the current
geopolitical environment.
What does all this mean for the Article’s argument? In one sense, it
remains undisturbed. Where conventional weapons can achieve the same
objectives as nuclear weapons, conventional weapons should be used. But in
another sense, the doctrine of belligerent reprisals is exceptional in that it may
authorize what is otherwise a manifestly illegal nuclear strike in certain
circumstances; namely, the use of nuclear weapons despite their unique
characteristics.
At this point one might ask: But if a manifestly illegal nuclear strike
targeting civilians with nuclear weapons leads to war crimes, how does that
square with the doctrine of jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international law,
which trump everything else—including, presumably, the doctrine of belligerent
reprisals? Would the jus cogens norm prohibiting war crimes not create liability
for all who planned and executed a reprisal authorized by international
humanitarian law?
Possibly not. Recall that jus cogens norms only prohibit certain conduct
that violates international law; they say little to nothing about liability resulting
from that violation. If the doctrine of belligerent reprisals is to be taken seriously
under humanitarian law as justifying otherwise unlawful conduct, it may be
treated as a species of affirmative defense to liability for the violation of
international humanitarian law. Here the violation of the jus cogens norm is
disaggregated from the accountability mechanism of enforcing international law.
Unlike jus cogens, international humanitarian law does have accountability
mechanisms, and rather robust ones at that. This is where the defense of
belligerent reprisals comes in. The war crimes endure as violations of jus cogens,
but under international humanitarian law, no liability attaches.
C. Human Rights Law
In addition to humanitarian law (the law of war), international human
rights law (the law that protects human rights everywhere the world over) has
something to say about whether a nuclear strike is legal. Questions exist as to
123
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whether and how human rights law overlaps with humanitarian law during times
of armed conflict. 124 Such overlap would theoretically create concurrent
jurisdiction: both laws govern the same conduct, leading to a potential conflict of
laws. The ICJ’s view in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion resolved this
potential conflict by essentially incorporating the standards of humanitarian law
into the standards of human rights law, effectively reconciling any conflict such
that while both laws apply, a single standard governs—namely, that of
humanitarian law.125
The technique used to arrive at this solution commonly goes by its Latin
name, lex specialis. Lex specialis simply means that the more specific law
governs over the more general.126 According to the ICJ, because international
humanitarian law governs the more specific situation of armed conflict, it wins.127
This is not to say that it pushes human rights law out of the way entirely. Rather,
human rights law also applies. But instead of prescribing its own separate
standard, it adopts or is informed by the lex specialis of humanitarian law.
Although the Court has more recently moved away somewhat from the lex
specialis concept to a more complementary approach,128 there is no reason to
believe that it has changed its opinion from its statement in the Advisory Opinion
that “whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in
warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of
the [International] Covenant [of Civil and Political Rights], can only be decided
by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the
terms of the Covenant itself.”129
What does this mean for the duty to reject a nuclear strike order? First, any
war crime that results in civilian deaths violates not only humanitarian law but
also human rights law—in particular, the right against the arbitrary deprivation of
life.130 Second, given what we know about the potential destructive power of
nuclear weapons and their far-reaching, long-term effects, it would not be
124
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inconceivable for some court to find that their use constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of life. For these violations too are subject to universal jurisdiction.131
Which leads to the third point: human rights law has far more robust and effective
accountability mechanisms than humanitarian law for obeying manifestly illegal
orders. There are, of course, regional human rights regimes that guarantee redress
in the form of investigation and, if warranted, prosecution.132 But more and more,
national courts are stepping in to fill the accountability void for serious violations
of international law in civil rather than criminal suits. And presumably the
signatories to the new Nuclear Weapons Ban treaty 133 will widen this
accountability in terms of committed jurisdictions.
To take one example, the Alien Tort Statute in the United States grants
U.S. district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations.” 134 These torts include
violations of the law of nations like war crimes and arbitrary loss of life.135
Although the U.S. Supreme Court cut back mightily on the scope of this statute by
restricting it to torts that “touch and concern” U.S. territory,136 presumably a
nuclear strike ordered from or against the United States would easily meet that
criterion. Again, given what we know about the pervasive effects of nuclear
blasts, an individual suit or even an enormous class action seeking to enforce
human rights under the statute seems entirely plausible.
V. Chain of Command
The next issue relates to the chain of command and control when it comes
to ordering a nuclear strike. This issue is central to the Article’s argument because
in order to impose a duty and a right to refuse to execute the order, a reasonable
person must have sufficient information to conclude that the order is manifestly
illegal. Put another way, the law would not bestow a right, and assuredly not a
duty to which liability attaches, unless the individual in question had the requisite
facts to make an informed legal judgment.
For instance, suppose the legislature passes a secret law. The law is on the
books but nobody knows about it because it is secret. Basic rule-of-law principles
would disqualify the law’s application as fundamentally unfair because any
individual to whom the law would apply would have had no notice of the law’s
existence, let alone its substantive provisions. In somewhat similar fashion, a
crewmember on a nuclear submarine who simply receives strike coordinates
ought not to be held liable if he does not, or reasonably should not, know the
131

For an analysis of offenses subject to universal jurisdiction, see Colangelo, supra note 65, at
149.
132
See Casey-Maslen, supra note 34, at 669–70.
133
Klimas, supra note 2.
134
28 U.S.C. 1350 (2006).
135
See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2006),
aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
136
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013).

2018 / Duty to Disobey

113

situation surrounding the strike, what it is targeting, and the probability of
manifestly illegal loss of civilian life and attendant war crimes.137 While the secret
law is fundamentally unfair since there is no notice of the law, the ignorant
crewmember scenario is fundamentally unfair because he has insufficient
knowledge of the facts. Despite the difference in ignorance between law and facts,
the same basic principle applies.
In turn, we must discern within the chain of command and control who has
what information when ordering the strike to determine who has the duty and the
right to reject an illegal strike order. I shall use the chain of command in the
United States for illustrative purposes because it is both the one with which I am
most familiar and about which I can gather the most information. I hope that this
Article may stimulate similar examinations of the nuclear command hierarchies of
the other eight nuclear weapons states as well as NATO.
Further, the legal argument presented here strongly confirms that the chain
of command all the way down and across, including all support functions and prestrike planning, receives and provides personnel with sufficient knowledge and
information to judge and reject an illegal order. For the duty to evaluate and reject
illegal orders resides not only in high-up positions that craft the options but also in
those who ultimately execute them.138 Although it occurs in practice, it is actually
an abdication of duty to keep those in the last line of the launch sequence in the
dark about the humanitarian laws of targeting distinction and discrimination,
proportionality, military necessity and other legal principles; as well as about
factual information regarding the unique features of nuclear weapons and the
strike’s intended target and options of conventional weapon use instead.139 Only
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with this knowledge of the law and the facts about a particular strike can the lowlevel crewmember fulfill his duty to reject an order as manifestly illegal.140
A. The President
A natural starting place in the chain of command is the person with the
sole power to order the launch of a nuclear weapon: the president.141 Although not
technically subject to the superior-orders defense, the president is the one who
ultimately gives the order (and thus can be liable for it) so therefore the position is
included in this discussion. It is theoretically possible that the president could
simply pick up the phone and give an order to a low-level crewmember to launch
a nuclear weapon, though this is not how the decision occurs in practice.142
Nonetheless, past presidents have gone so far as to preauthorize the use of nuclear
weapons for top military commanders under specified, emergency conditions.143
The release of nuclear weapons is also governed by what is referred to as
the “two-man rule” (though as we will see, it is a rule that does not bind the
president) in order to prevent accidental or malicious launches by a single
individual.144 At the highest level, this rule asks that the president jointly issue
launch orders with the Secretary of Defense and continues down the chain of
command with commanding officers and executive officers working in tandem,
and missile operators agreeing on launch order validity.145 However, this check on
140
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the president’s authority may be illusory, because there is nothing the Secretary of
Defense could do to stop such a presidential strike order, as military officers
ordinarily will likely launch nuclear missiles from a valid, presidential
command.146 Incidentally, the Secretary of Defense has never refused to concur
with a presidential order to launch nuclear weapons (which is not surprising given
that it has only happened twice, and both times during World War II); hence the
strength of this check on the president’s power is, at this moment, unknown. The
point therefore remains that the president has the sole power to directly call the
crewmember and issue a command. In such a situation, only the president would
likely be exposed to liability for a manifestly illegal order, unless of course the
president fills in the crewmember with sufficient detail about the strike such that
he or she should know whether it is manifestly illegal under humanitarian and
human rights law.
Thus, just as with the international law analysis, analysis of who has the
relevant information and when they have it is a contextual inquiry dependent upon
the specific situation surrounding the specific strike order.147 Provision of such
information to all individuals down the chain of command should occur, but may
not be practical for, say, technical or operational security reasons. Yet one thing is
certain: because the president enjoys exclusive authority to issue the order, any
duty and accompanying liability for a manifestly illegal strike runs straight up the
chain of command to the very top.
B. STRATCOM and Related Bodies
Again, however, a direct order from the president to a crewmember is not
how a nuclear strike order would likely operate in practice. Rather, STRATCOM
and related bodies like the combatant commands (CCMDs), along with the
civilian chain of command, develop options for the president should he
contemplate any order ranging from a nuclear strike to those made in emergency
or crisis situations.148 Thus the primary decision to strike and the strike’s broad
objectives always rest in the president’s hands, while his military and civilian
chain of command craft options for achieving those objectives. These options may
include the nuclear option, about which the president receives detailed
information.149 This process of crafting options comprises the bread and butter of
the duty and right to recognize and reject a manifestly illegal order. The fact that
those in the chain of command do not actually “pull the trigger” does not relieve
them of liability, as the High Command case from the Nuremburg tribunal makes
146
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clear. 150 As noted above,151 because the inquiry is so contextual, it is possible that
anyone down and across the chain of command—including those who develop the
targeting options and packages, those who review them for their legality, and
particularly well-informed crewmembers—would also have this duty and right.152
C. Multistage Vetting
Fortunately for the United States, the chain of command seriously strives
to incorporate the proper international humanitarian law (and thus human rights
law) into the options presented to the president.153 Kehler describes a five-stage
process in developing options, each of which is designed not only to meet the
president’s objectives but also to fastidiously comply with international law. The
stages comprise option development, target selection, weapon application, legal
advice and review, and other effects.154
While each stage considers the legal implications of the strike,
humanitarian law most informs the “target selection” and “weapon application”
stages.155 Moreover, and crucially to this Article’s argument, at the “other effects”
stage “[p]lanners also consider other nuclear weapon effects beyond blasts (such
as fire; electromagnetic pulse; radiation) in their modeling analysis.”156 Finally,
embedded in and finalizing the process are lawyers tasked with ensuring the strike
complies with humanitarian law.157
D. Immunities
But what if a strike is likely to be deemed manifestly illegal by a
competent judicial body, whether domestic or international? Would it make any
real difference at all, other than symbolic, since the president and those high up
the chain of command—precisely those who most likely would be charged with
the duty to reject the order—might be cloaked in immunities, especially vis-à-vis
150
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those judicial bodies most likely to hold them accountable, like foreign and
international tribunals?
Two initial rejoinders: first, as the ICJ has noted, immunity would not
apply before an international tribunal with jurisdictional competence;158 second, it
is unclear how far down the chain of command immunity would extend. Certainly
heads of state and officials like foreign ministers who represent the state on the
international stage enjoy the privilege.159 But beyond that, the law is unclear. The
whole reason heads of state and foreign ministers enjoy immunity is that the state
would be unable to effectively represent itself in its dealings with other states if
these individuals were stuck in foreign states’ docks. Conversely high-ranking
members of STRATCOM and other planning bodies likely fall outside the scope
of immunity. Needless to say, the farther down the chain one goes, the less
immunity is likely to apply. Overall, only heads of state and perhaps other
extremely high-ranking officials would likely be immune from suit before foreign
tribunals.
Immunities before domestic state courts come in various flavors. Foreign
sovereign immunity, or foreign state immunity, immunizes from suit foreign
sovereigns qua sovereigns. 160 Thus, foreign sovereign immunity immunizes
Italy—the sovereign state—from suit in U.S. courts. In the United States this form
of immunity is currently governed by statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976.161 Foreign official immunity or, where applicable, head-of-state
immunity,162 shields from suit particular high-ranking officials of foreign states,
such as heads of state and foreign ministers.163 Thus, foreign official or head-ofstate immunity immunizes the Italian president and, presumably, prime minister
from suit in U.S. courts.
A further distinction exists between immunity that attaches because of a
particular status, such as being head of state or other high ranking official, and
immunity that attaches because of the nature of the particular conduct underlying
a claim, such as conduct performed as part of the actor’s official duties. These
immunities are referred to, respectively, as status-based immunity and conductbased immunity.164 Status-based immunity is basically an absolute protection for
certain high-ranking officials (like heads of state) against all proceedings in other
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states’ courts.165 That is, it blocks all foreign proceedings against these officials,
irrespective of whether the proceedings relate to the officials’ public or private
acts or whether the acts occurred during or before the officials’ tenure in office.166
However, because the immunity attaches only to the officials’ status as an office
holder, once tenure in office ceases so too does the status-based immunity.167
At this point, the only immunity potentially available to former officials is
conduct-based immunity. This form of immunity is both broader and narrower
than status-based immunity. It is broader in the sense that it arguably extends to
anyone acting on behalf of the state, not just high-level officials, and it also
continues to protect former officials after they have left office. But it is narrower
because, as its name suggests, it applies only in respect to official conduct.168 A
key question in both U.S. and international law is whether this conduct-based
immunity attaches in respect to conduct that constitutes serious violations of
international law and, more specifically, jus cogens violations like war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
The reason why status-based immunity does not yield to jus cogens is that
courts have deemed it “jurisdictional.”169 That is to say, it simply deprives the
court of jurisdiction to hear the case while the officeholder enjoys the privilege of
the office. However, once the officeholder leaves office, the immunity lapses
because the office no longer blocks the court’s jurisdiction.170
Conduct-based immunity is somewhat more complicated. Courts have yet
to definitively say that it is entirely jurisdictional; thus it may constitute a
substantive defense—in which case it would come into direct conflict with, and
necessarily yield to, the peremptory norm.171 And since a jus cogens violation
cannot qualify as a legitimate official act there exists the possibility of suit,
whether criminal or civil, where a high-ranking official issues or fails to reject a
manifestly illegal order. In other words, the substantive defense of immunity will
be no barrier to the enforcement of jus cogens, which by definition override all
165
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contrary norms. However, as noted, the law on this topic is in flux. Moreover,
according to its own internal processes, a state may waive immunity as to its own
current or former officials before foreign courts.172
In sum, immunities are not the substantial bar to suit they may first appear
to be. They do not apply before international tribunals with competent
jurisdiction; they do not apply to individuals who do not represent the state on the
international plane; and, even for high-ranking officials who do represent the state
on the international plane, suit is possible if immunity is waived or, after the
official leaves office, the immunity is deemed substantive and conflicts with, and
thus yields to, jus cogens.
VI. Non-State Actors
It may be tempting to conclude that none of what has been said so far
about the duty to disobey illegal nuclear strike orders applies to terrorists or other
non-state actors. Certainly, a strict reading of conventional law and, in particular,
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, covers only “states parties” to
the treaties. But as Part IV explained, the law against war crimes is not simply
treaty-based. Rather, it has passed into customary international law. Moreover, it
is now considered peremptory international law subject to universal jurisdiction.
This means that it applies universally to everyone, everywhere.173 In fact, as
crimes of universal jurisdiction, any state in the world can prosecute irrespective
of whether the state has any connection to the offense.174
Here it is not just the norm that is customary law, but also the liability that
attaches to that norm—and it attaches not just to states but also to individuals. At
least since Nuremburg, international and domestic jurisprudence have been clear
that individuals may be held liable for serious violations of international law. And
because the relevant international law includes a universally applicable customary
law enforceable by all states, non-state actors cannot escape its net.
VII. Conclusion
The beginning of this Article posed the question of whether the duty to
disobey illegal nuclear strike orders merely constituted an affirmative defense in
military proceedings or whether it stood for something more for the international
legal system as a whole. The answer should be plain: Executing a nuclear strike
order that personnel know or should know is manifestly illegal will likely result in
172
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liability for potentially anyone in the world for some of the most serious offenses
under international law, like war crimes and arbitrary loss of life. This duty
constitutes a powerful legal norm with far-reaching implications for humanitarian
law and practice, diminishing in some scenarios the lawful possible use of nuclear
weapons to the vanishing point. It also constitutes a powerful counter-norm that
argues against the use of nuclear weapons as a matter of policy and strategic
decision-making. The overall import of the combination of this norm and counternorm is to marginalize nuclear weapons, giving them no meaningful place—under
international law or within the international legal system generally—among the
lawful options available to a commander considering an attack near a civilian
population.

